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When local public goods are provided by a centralized authority, spillovers may be 
coordinated, but heterogeneity in preferences may be suppressed. Besley and Coate (2003) 
have already solved this classic trade off for a uniform tax regime. Here, we extend their 
approach by allowing for a non uniform tax regime. We find that centralization with our tax 
system necessarily increases welfare in comparison to uniform tax centralization. Importantly, 
with  non cooperative  legislators  coming  from  homogenous  districts,  our  centralization 
dominates decentralization for any degree of spillovers. In other cases, it at least improves 
odds of centralization, if measured by utilitarian yardstick. 
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11 Introduction
Centralization involves a host of trade-oﬀs. A centralized government can exploit returns to
scale in public goods provision, but faces pronounced information asymmetry. Spillovers can
be eﬃciently resolved by centralization, but centralized budget may require more distortive
taxation. Also, centralization may induce higher total investment into wasteful rent-seeking
activities.
The case for centralization of local public goods is predominantly driven by cross-border
spillovers. For instance, imagine maintained ski and bike routes dispersed across borders,
and user fees prohibitively costly to charge. Or, following an example by Hillman (2003,
p. 570), one community may have strict gun control laws, while a neighboring community
does not; in eﬀect, criminals can buy their guns and switch to the other community with
less armed honest citizens.
Interjurisdictional spillovers obviously call for centralization, since centralization involves
internalization of externalities. The case may be strengthened in the presence of economies
of scale in public good production (or, in tax administration, as Redoano and Scharﬀ (2004)
argue).
However, centralization is not costless. As Oates (1972) argues, welfare loss arises if
jurisdictions vary in preferences, and the amount of public good is bound to be equal across
jurisdictions. The loss magniﬁes with increase in price elasticity of public good demand.
Secondly, the issue of asymmetric information is of extreme relevance here. For central
authority, reliable local information is costlier to obtain. Voters observe lower yardstick
competition at the central level and, hence, have fewer opportunities to assess public sector
performance.
Seabright (1996) builds a model capturing another important problem of centralization,
namely lower accountability. Centralization may decrease level of political competition, pro-
viding additional source of political rents. Furthermore, the proponents of FOCJ concept
(Functionally Overlapping Competing Jurisdiction), mainly Frey (1996), observe slower pol-
icy innovation in centralized system. On the other hand, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2001)
construct a model with opposite results.
2When interest groups in jurisdictions share interests and lobbying features economies
of scale, centralization may also boost rent-seeking expenditures and consequently distort
market allocation (Bordignon et al. 2003, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000).
To be able to tackle beneﬁts and costs of centralization, we restrict our attention to the
classic trade-oﬀ between spillovers and heterogeneity. We put aside other, albeit important,
issues of locational choice, accountability, and incomplete information.
Our approach draws from setup of Besley and Coate (2003), but we extend their approach
by introducing a non-uniform tax system. In other words, we study how centralization
performs when beneﬁts (i.e. amounts of local public goods) as well as costs are non-uniform
across districts.
Besley and Coate (2003) depart from the existing literature in emphasizing the political
processes of decision making. If governments under centralized systems were allowed to
allocate diﬀerent levels of local public goods to diﬀerent districts, they could respect the
preferences of citizens in each district while optimally accounting for cross-border spillovers.
This would make the centralized system preferable. If there is a case for a decentralized
system then, it must follow from the political economy considerations.
Centralization has been typically modeled as a system in which public spending is ﬁ-
nanced by general taxation and all jurisdictions receive a uniform level of local public goods.
In a decentralized system local public goods are ﬁnanced by local taxation and each district
chooses its own preferred level. This approach has been adopted by Oates (1972) who argued
that the drawbacks of centralized and decentralized systems are uniformity in provision and
absence of reﬂecting the beneﬁts going to other regions, respectively. This logic relies cru-
cially on the assumption that centralization provides uniform levels of public goods. Besley
and Coate (2003) relax this assumption and then study various forms of centralized decision
making.
We also relax the assumption of policy uniformity (i.e. uniform level of public goods)
stipulated in Oates (1972) and Musgrave (1959). To our knowledge, this assumption may
only be motivated by implications of asymmetric information incentives between central
and local authorities. Cheikbossian (2000) argues that in a game played between central
policy-maker and decentralized authorities, the latter have an incentive to report excessive
3expenditure need and low tax-paying capacity. This misinformation induces policy unifor-
mity.
The main innovation of our approach is to let district-speciﬁc head-tax depend on the
amount of public good provided in each region. The reason is that for district-uniform head-
tax, a marginal increase in public spending in one district increases average tax across all
districts equally. In our tax system, the increase is not equal, but higher for the beneﬁciary
district. This brings marginal cost of public good provision closer to the marginal beneﬁt
and improves odds for centralization compared to decentralization.
For centralized legislature, we postulate two types of policy makers, non-cooperative and
cooperative. We observe that cooperativeness as such cannot resolve conﬂict in preferences
among the regions, since voters can insure against policy cooperativeness by strategic dele-
gation. Strategic delegation has origins in industrial economics (Fershtman and Judd 1987)
and monetary policy (Rogoﬀ 1985), resulting in issues of ﬁscal policy (Persson and Tabellini
1990). In our framework, a non-cooperative voter delegates a policy maker with diﬀerent
concern for local public good than is his or her own. We thus complement Cheikbossian
(2000) who describes strategic delegation in decentralization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the framework for
our analysis. Section 3 provides a brief review of the standard analysis. Section 4 presents
a political economy analysis with two forms of taxation beginning with a centralized system
based on minimum winning coalition. Section 5 continues in this direction considering a
more cooperative legislature. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There are 2 geographically distinct regions or districts indexed by i ∈ {1,2} each populated
by a continuum of citizens with a mass of unity. The citizens are immobile between the
regions. The economy contains 3 goods: a single private good, x, and two local public
goods, g1 and g2, each one associated with a particular district.1 Each citizen is endowed
with some of the private good and throughout we will assume that the endowments are high
1The parameters g1 and g2 can be thought of as being the same public good provided at diﬀerent levels
in each district, as further assumptions may indicate. But to make the model richer, we will assume two
distinct local public goods such as e.g. airports and roads each associated with a particular region.
4enough for each citizen to meet their required tax obligations. To produce one unit of either
of the public goods requires p units of the private good.2
Each citizen in district i is characterized by a public goods preference parameter λ.3
The preferences of a type λ citizen in district i are
x + λ[(1 − κ)lngi + κlng−i], 4
where parameter κ ∈  0,1/2  indexes the degree of spillovers. When κ = 0, citizens consume
only the public good in their own district, while for κ = 1/2 they equally consume public
goods in both districts. Uniform κ (across regions) means that citizens from both districts
consume both public goods in the same proportion.5
The range of preference types is  0,λ  in each district. The respective median type in
district i is denoted by mi. We assume, without loss of generality, that the median citizen
in district 1 is at least as pro-public spending as his counterpart in district 2, i.e. m1 ≥ m2.
We also assume that 2m1 < λ. The latter condition will be needed in Section 5 to obtain
interior solutions.
Under a decentralized system, the level of public good in each district is chosen by the
government of that district and public goods are ﬁnanced by a uniform head tax on local
residents. Thus, if district i chooses a public good level gi, each citizen in this district pays
a tax of pgi. Under a centralized system, the levels of public goods are determined by a
government that represents both regions. Spending is being ﬁnanced by two possible tax
systems whose outcomes will be compared. The ﬁrst one is a uniform head tax on all citizens;
with public good levels (g1,g2), this tax is
p(g1 + g2)
2
. The second one is a head tax which
is non-uniform across districts, but uniform for all citizens within a given region. Citizen
2That is, we deﬁne one unit of each of the public good to represent such a quantity that costs p units of
the private good.
3The parameter λ can be interpreted as indicating the interest in public goods of both districts.
4See discussion papers of Besley and Coate for more universal speciﬁcations of public goods preferences.
5However, it could be that citizens from district 1 cared equally about the public goods in both districts,
whereas citizens from district 2 cared only about their own public good. That is to say, proportional public
goods preferences κ could diﬀer among regions. Moreover, diﬀerences among citizens from the same district
could occur, i.e. a citizen could, for instance, derive beneﬁt from both public goods, but his neighbor from
the same district could be interested only in the public good provided by his own district. We will, however,
assume these spillovers to be of a purely technical nature. Moreover, we will assume them to be the same
for citizens from both districts as well as for the citizens in a given region to be able to capture the fact
that the resolution between centralization and decentralization depends on the degree of spillovers and the
extent of heterogeneity in preferences for public goods.
5of each region pays a head tax proportional to his consumption of both public goods; thus,
public good levels (g1,g2) and degree of spillovers κ result in a head tax of pgi(1−κ)+pg−iκ
in district i.6, 7
Our social welfare criterion for comparing the performance of centralized and decentral-
ized provision of local public goods will be aggregate public goods surplus. With public good
levels (g1,g2), it is deﬁned as
S(g1,g2) = [m1(1 − κ) + m2κ]lng1 + [m2(1 − κ) + m1κ]lng2 − p(g1 + g2).
The surplus is a median citizens’ sum of marginal beneﬁts from their consumption of public
goods or, more precisely, a sum of diﬀerences between median citizens’ utilities under the
system with public goods and the system without public goods:
∆Um1 + ∆Um2 = x1 − pg1 + m1[(1 − κ)lng1 + κlng2] − x1
+ x2 − pg2 + m2[(1 − κ)lng2 + κlng1] − x2
= S(g1,g2).
The surplus-maximizing public good levels are
(g1,g2) =
 
m1(1 − κ) + m2κ
p
,




This result reveals that the surplus-maximizing public good levels take account of the beneﬁts
received by citizens from both districts.
3 The Standard Analysis
The above outlined model allows a simple exposition of the traditional analysis according to
Oates (1972), who inﬂuenced many public ﬁnance economists’ views on the relative merits
6Of course, this tax system is uniform in the case when the levels of public goods in both districts equal.
Otherwise, it is non-uniform, which is the reason we have identiﬁed it as such.
7What is worth noting here regarding both tax systems is that uniform taxation implies shared ﬁnancing
of the public goods whereas non-uniform tax system means that each district pays proportionally to its
consumption. If it consumes less, it pays less; if it consumes more, it pays more.
8The vector is an interior solution of a simple maximization of function S(g1,g2). We obtain it by taking
ﬁrst-order conditions, i.e. by diﬀerentiating this function w.r.t. g1 and g2 and setting equal to zero. It is
straightforward to verify that second-order conditions are satisﬁed and we leave this proof to the reader.
This remark applies to all of the subsequent maximization problems.
6of centralization and decentralization. He supposed that, in a decentralized system, each
district’s government independently chooses the policy which maximizes public goods surplus
in the region (which is ∆Umi, i ∈ {1,2}). A pair of expenditure levels (gd
1,gd
2) will form a
Nash equilibrium, which requires that:
g
d
i = arg max
gi
{mi[(1 − κ)lngi + κlng
d
−i] − pgi}, i ∈ {1,2}.














Each region’s government thus only takes into account the beneﬁts received by his con-
stituency and local public goods are surplus-maximizing only when there are no spillovers,
regardless of heterogeneity in tastes. When spillovers occur, public goods production results
in under-provision in both districts and this under-provision is increasing in the extent of
spillovers.
Under a centralized system, Oates assumed that the government would be restricted to
provide a uniform level of the public goods, denoted gc. He further assumed that expenditures
would be ﬁnanced by a uniform head tax, which is in the case of uniform provision of
public goods identical to our proposed non-uniform head tax that takes into account the
proportional consumption of both goods by citizens from each region.9 This common level
of public goods satisﬁes
g
c = arg max
g







The uniform level of public goods is independent of the level of spillovers and results in the
surplus-maximizing level only in the case of identical districts.10 However, when m1 > m2,
centralization over-provides public goods to district 2 and under-provides them to district 1




= pg equals pg(1 − κ) + pgκ = pg.
10Throughout the text, the phrases identical (non-identical) and homogeneous (heterogeneous) districts
will indicate that the median citizens from each region have (do not have) the same public goods preferences.
7except when spillovers are maximal, i.e. κ = 1/2. In this situation, citizens consume public
goods in both districts equally which leads to uniform provision of public goods in both
regions.
3.1 Comparative Statics
When regions are homogeneous, centralization produces surplus maximizing public goods
levels and dominates decentralization when spillovers are present.11 However, the two sys-




























Figure 1: Aggregate public goods surpluses under decentralization (Sd) and centralization
in the standard analysis (Sc
t).
In the case of heterogeneous districts, decentralization produces surplus maximizing public
goods levels and dominates centralization when there are no spillovers. On the other hand,
when the spillovers are maximal, centralization produces surplus maximizing public goods
levels and dominates decentralization. Finally, when the spillovers are somewhere in between
these two polar cases, there exists a critical level of spillovers above which centralization
dominates and under which decentralization is preferred (Figure 1b).
Proposition 1. Suppose that the assumptions of the standard analysis are satisﬁed. Then
11In this case, centralization has the conventional advantage of internalizing spillovers.
8(i) If the regions are homogeneous and spillovers are present (κ > 0), a centralized system
produces a higher level of surplus than does decentralization. Absent spillovers (κ = 0),
the two systems generate the same level of surplus.
(ii) If the districts are heterogeneous, there is a critical value of κ, greater than zero but
less than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus if and
only if κ exceeds this critical level.12
According to Oates, without spillovers, a decentralized system is preferred. With spillovers
and homogeneous districts, a centralized system is superior. With spillovers and heteroge-
neous regions, it is necessary to compare the extent of the two eﬀects.
It is often suggested that heterogeneity favors the case for decentralization. However,
in our model, this does not follow. To establish such a proposition, it would be necessary
to show that the critical level of spillovers is increasing in heterogeneity. But there is no
guarantee that this is so.13
Modeling the trade-oﬀ in the standard analysis relies on the assumption of uniform
expenditures in a centralized system. But this assumption is too strong and does not cor-
respond with empirical evidence that expenditures vary across districts in many countries.
We will now relax this assumption and model the decision making institutions which decide
upon allocation of resources in both centralized and decentralized systems.
12The proof of this as well as the other results may be found in the Appendix.
13This may be analyzed by letting Sd(κ,α) and Sc
t(κ,α) denote surpluses under decentralization and
centralization, respectively, when (m1,m2) = (αω,(1 − α)ω), where α ∈  1/2,1  measures the degree of
heterogeneity between the two regions. Districts are identical when α = 1/2 and become more heterogeneous
when α increases.
Then Sc
t(κ,α) = ω ln
ω
2p
− ω, which is independent of both κ and α. Therefore we can write Sc
t(κ,α) = Sc
t.
The critical value of κ, denoted κ∗(α), is uniquely deﬁned by the equation Sd(κ∗,α) = Sc
t. To show that κ∗











The ﬁrst term is positive, while the second one is negative. As spillovers increase, the ﬁrst term goes to zero.
Thus, it is possible that ∂Sd(κ,α)/∂α < 0. (In our speciﬁcation of public goods preferences, surplus under
decentralization is always decreasing in heterogeneity for all κ > 1/4. This ﬁnding makes it possible that the
critical level of spillovers is decreasing in heterogeneity, i.e. the case for centralization could be strengthened
as the regions become more diverse.)
94 A Political Economy Analysis with Two Forms of
Taxation
4.1 Policy Determination Under Decentralization
In a decentralized system, we assume that each region elects a single representative from that
region to choose policy. Our model is based on the citizen-candidate approach to political
decision making, which has two stages. First, elections determine which citizen from each
district is selected to constitute the decision making government in that district (election
stage). Second, policies are chosen simultaneously by the elected representatives in each
district (policy-selection stage).
Using backward induction,14 let us proceed as follows. First, we ﬁnd what elected
representatives select (stage 2 or policy-selection stage) and then we discuss whom citizens,
considering outcomes which are subsequently selected by representatives, will appoint to an
oﬃce (stage 1 or election stage). Beginning with stage 2, let the types of the representatives
in district 1 and 2 be λ1 and λ2, respectively.15 Then the policy outcome (g1(λ1),g2(λ2))
satisﬁes
gi(λi) = arg max
gi
{λi[(1 − κ)lngi + κlng−i(λ−i)] − pgi}, for i ∈ {1,2}.










The level of each district’s public goods spending is higher the stronger is the public good
preference of its representative and lower the higher the level of spillovers.
Now let us move to stage 1. With the representatives λ1 and λ2 in region 1 and 2,










− λi(1 − κ).
14Backward induction is an iterative process for solving ﬁnite extensive form games. First, one determines
the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the
next-to-last moving player is determined taking the last player’s action as given. The process continues in
this way backwards in time until all players’ actions have been determined. Eﬀectively, one determines the
Nash equilibrium of each subgame of the original game.
15We assume that (i) candidates have no opportunity costs, i.e. any citizen can agree to be a candidate; and
that (ii) representatives can only decide on the provision of public goods, i.e. there are no other perquisites
of the oﬃce.
10These preferences over types determine citizens’ voting decisions. A pair of representative
types (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred under decentralization if, in each district i, a majority of
citizens prefer the type of their representative to any other type λ ∈  0,λ , given the type
of the other district’s representative λ∗
−i.
We assume that the elected representatives in the two regions will be of these majority
preferred types. Further we assume that each citizen votes sincerely (according to his public
goods preferences), all citizens always vote and have perfect information.
Citizens’ preferences over types are single-peaked,16 implying that a pair of representative
types is majority preferred under decentralization if and only if it is a median pair; i.e.
(λ∗
1,λ∗
2) = (m1,m2). This yields:
Lemma 1. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed.










These levels of local public goods respect the preferences of the median citizen within a
region, which agrees with the standard local public ﬁnance analysis.
4.2 Policy Determination Under Centralization with Two Forms
of Taxation
The policy determination process under centralization also has two steps: an election stage;
and a policy selection stage. In the elections, one citizen from each district is chosen to serve
in a common legislature. In the policy selection stage, the legislature determines public goods
provision in each region. Our ﬁrst method of capturing the decision making process in the
legislature will be the minimum winning coalition view. Under this view, a coalition of just-
above-50% of the representatives forms to share the beneﬁts of public spending among their
districts. Regions whose representatives are outside the coalition are only allocated spending
to the extent that this beneﬁts coalition members. The logic is that, in a majority rule
legislature, if there were any more than just-above-50% of the representatives in the coalition
16Given any two types ˆ λi and λ′
i such that λ′
i < ˆ λi < λ or λ < ˆ λi < λ′
i, type λ citizens always prefer type
ˆ λi citizens.
11supporting the spending bill, the majority of coalition members would beneﬁt from expelling
the surplus members and further concentrating spending on their own regions. Because
there are many possible minimum winning coalitions, this view suggests that there will be
uncertainty concerning the identity of the coalition that forms to determine expenditures.
In our model, we may capture this uncertainty by assuming that each representative
can be thought of as a minimum winning coalition with equal probability. Thus, again
using backward induction, if the representatives are of types λ1 and λ2, the policy outcome
will be (g1
1(λ1),g1
2(λ1)) with probability 1/2 and (g2
1(λ2),g2
2(λ2)) with probability 1/2, where
(gi
1(λi),gi
2(λi)) is the optimal choice of district i’s representative.
4.2.1 Policy Determination with Uniform Taxation






2(λi)) = arg max
(gi,g−i)
 



















, i ∈ {1,2}.
The level of public goods spending depends only on the decisive representative’s preference
for public goods and the level of spillovers. The stronger the preferences for public goods
of the decisive representative are, the higher is the spending. Furthermore, spending for
the representative’s domestic public good varies inversely with spillovers while the other
district’s public good expenditures vary proportionally with spillovers.
When the representative types are λ1 and λ2, a citizen of type λ in region i obtains an



























Again we assume that the representatives will be of the majority preferred types. A pair of
representative types (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if in each district i the median
12type prefers λ∗
i to any other type λ ∈  0,λ , given the other district’s representative type
λ∗
−i.17 This means that (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium


































Thus, an elected pair of representatives will be of types (m1,m2) and will choose a policy
which reﬂects their public goods preferences. So we have:
Lemma 2. Suppose that the taxation is uniform and the assumptions of the political economy
analysis are satisﬁed. Then the policy outcome under centralization with a minimum winning


















This result illuminates the main drawbacks of centralization with a minimum winning
coalition legislature and uniform taxation:
1) Uncertainty: each district faces uncertainty as to the amount of public good that it will
receive, reﬂecting the uncertainty in the identity of the minimum winning coalition.
2) Misallocation: public expenditures across regions are skewed towards those inside the
winning coalition.
4.2.2 Comparative Statics
The only situation in which centralization produces the surplus maximizing level is when
the districts are identical and spillovers are maximal (κ = 1/2). When districts diﬀer (m1 >
17If citizens of type λ prefer a type ˆ λi candidate to a type λ′
i, where ˆ λi < λ′
i (ˆ λi > λ′
i), then so must all
citizens of types lower (higher) than λ. This implies that a majority of citizens in district i prefer a type
ˆ λi candidate to a type λ′
i candidate if and only if the median type prefers a type ˆ λi candidate to a type λ′
i
candidate.
13m2) and spillovers are complete, spending is allocated equally across regions but district
1’s representative over-provides local public goods, while district 2’s representative under-
provides them. While higher levels of spillovers still lead those in the minimum winning
coalition to allocate public goods to districts outside the coalition, it is only to the extent
that this beneﬁts those inside the coalition.
For low levels of spillovers, the misallocation problem is at its worse. Public goods are
over-provided to regions in the minimum winning coalition and under-provided to those dis-
tricts that are outside the coalition, reﬂecting the budgetary externality created by common
ﬁnancing. However, this drawback is signiﬁcantly suppressed when the non-uniform tax
system is introduced.
4.2.3 Policy Determination with Non-uniform Taxation
With non-uniform taxation and representatives of types λ1 and λ2, the optimal choice of





2(λi)) = arg max
(gi,g−i)
{λi[(1 − κ)lngi + κlng−i] − (pgi(1 − κ) + pg−iκ)}.













, i ∈ {1,2}.
As above, if the representative types are λ1 and λ2, a citizen of type λ in district i obtains


























Analogically to the case of uniform taxation, we arrive at the conclusion that an elected pair
of representatives will be of types (m1,m2) and that they will choose a policy which reﬂects
their preferences. This establishes:
Lemma 3. Suppose that the tax system is non-uniform across districts and the assump-
tions of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed. Then the policy chosen under centra-


















14Compared to the case of uniform taxation, the problem of uncertainty remains due to the
unknown identity of the coalition. However, the drawback of misallocation is signiﬁcantly
reduced reﬂecting the fact that each district is taxed according to its proportional consump-
tion of both local public goods. This suppresses the incentives of the coalition members to
allocate too much of the public goods to their districts while forgetting about the regions
outside the coalition.
4.2.4 Comparative Statics
The levels of public goods are independent of spillovers. They only depend on preferences
of the decisive representative which then chooses uniform provision of public goods. With
identical representatives, centralization with non-uniform taxation produces the surplus max-
imizing levels of local public goods. When m1 exceeds m2 and spillovers are complete, region
1’s representative over-provides local public goods, while district 2’s representative under-
provides them.
The misallocation problem is at its worse when the spillovers are lower than complete.
The levels of public goods provided are further from the optimal, aggregate surplus enhancing
levels. However, the extent of these misallocations is lower than that under the centralized
system with uniform taxation.
4.3 Centralization vs. Decentralization
4.3.1 Homogeneous districts
Decentralization produces the surplus maximizing public goods levels only when the spillovers
do not occur. We have already seen that public goods levels under centralization with uni-
form taxation are surplus maximizing when the spillovers are complete and the districts are
homogeneous. It follows that, in the case of identical districts, decentralization dominates
when the spillovers are small and centralization is preferred when the spillovers are large.
Centralization with non-uniform taxation produces the surplus maximizing public goods
levels when the districts are identical. This surplus is independent of spillovers and is higher
than the surplus under decentralization for all κ except when the spillovers are absent. In
such a case, both systems generate the surplus maximizing public goods levels. The next
15proposition and Figure 2 summarize these results.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed,
the centralized decision making relies on the minimum winning coalition, and the districts
are identical. Then
(i) If the taxation is uniform, there is a critical value of κ, strictly greater than 0 but less
than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus if and only
if κ exceeds this critical level.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform across districts and spillovers are present (κ > 0), a
centralized system produces a higher level of surplus than does decentralization. Absent
spillovers (κ = 0), the two systems generate the same level of surplus.
(iii) Surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation equals that under the centra-
lized system in the standard analysis for all levels of spillovers. These surpluses are
higher than that under centralization with uniform taxation except when the spillovers
are maximal (κ = 1/2). In such a case, all three systems of centralization produce the
















Figure 2: Aggregate public goods surpluses under decentralization (Sd), centralization in
the standard analysis (Sc
t) and centralization with uniform (Sc
u) and non-uniform
(Sc
n) taxation in the case of identical districts.
There are two comparisons which require analysis. First, comparing Proposition 2 with
its counterpart in part (i) of the Proposition 1, there is one signiﬁcant diﬀerence. With
16identical districts, centralized system in the standard analysis is supposed to dominate de-
centralization for all κ > 0. However, centralization based on minimum winning coalition
and uniform taxation no more dominates for low levels of spillovers, as those inside the
coalition have low incentives to provide public goods to the outside regions. This is further
combined with the uncertain identity of the coalition. With higher spillovers, uncertainty
remains but the decisive representatives have higher incentives to provide more public goods
to both districts, which increases the surplus under centralization. Thus, political economy
analysis weakens the case for centralization when the taxation is uniform.
Second, comparison of the two centralized systems under the political economy analysis
generates a strong case for centralization with non-uniform taxation, which dominates for
all κ < 1/2. This is due to the eﬀects that each taxation has on the decisions about the
allocation of public expenditures. When the taxation is uniform, each district pays the same
head-tax independent of the received level of public goods. This motivates coalition members
to allocate as much as they prefer to their districts. In contrast, under the centralized
system with non-uniform taxation there is no such eﬀect, as each district is taxed according
to its proportional consumption of both local public goods. This balances the allocated
levels and centralization with non-uniform taxation signiﬁcantly dominates centralization
with a uniform tax system. Furthermore, the resulting surplus under centralization with
non-uniform taxation is the same as under centralization in the standard analysis.18
4.3.2 Heterogeneous districts
When the regions are heterogeneous, centralized system with uniform taxation still dominates
decentralization for high levels of spillovers and its performance is increasing in spillovers.
Thus, there is a critical value of κ under which decentralization is preferred and above which
centralization dominates.
Centralization with non-uniform taxation is independent of spillovers, produces higher
level of surplus than decentralization for maximal spillovers and lower level of surplus for zero
spillovers. It follows that there exists a critical value of κ above which centralized system
18This is due to the fact that the provision of public goods and the actual taxes under centralization with
non-uniform taxation are the same as under the centralized system in the standard analysis. With identical
districts, each representative would choose such uniform public goods levels that would be chosen by all the
other representatives, if elected.
17dominates and under which decentralization is preferred. However, this critical value is
lower than that in the uniform taxation case. Again, the following proposition and Figure 3
summarize these ﬁndings.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed,
the centralized decision making relies on the minimum winning coalition, and the districts
are non-identical. Then
(i) If the taxation is uniform, there is a critical value of κ, strictly greater than 0 but less
than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus if and only
if κ exceeds this critical level. This critical level is higher than that in the standard
analysis.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform across districts, there is a critical value of κ, strictly
greater than 0 but less than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level
of surplus if and only if κ exceeds this critical level. This critical level is higher than
that in the standard analysis and lower than that under centralization with uniform
taxation.
(iii) Surplus under centralization in the standard analysis is higher than surpluses under
both centralized systems in the political economy analysis for all levels of spillovers.
Furthermore, surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is higher than
that under the centralized system with uniform taxation except when the spillovers are
maximal (κ = 1/2). In such a case, the two systems produce the same public goods
surplus.
As above, two juxtapositions can be observed. First, comparing Proposition 3 with its
relevant counterpart in part (ii) of the Proposition 1 reveals that centralization with non-
cooperative legislature creates even larger incongruity when the districts are heterogeneous.
This exacerbated misallocation problem combined with the persistent drawback of uncer-
tainty results in a weakened case for centralization compared with the centralized system in

















Figure 3: Aggregate public goods surpluses under decentralization (Sd), centralization in
the standard analysis (Sc
t) and centralization with uniform (Sc
u) and non-uniform
(Sc
n) taxation in the case of non-identical districts.
under the political economy analysis as under the traditional one—for low spillover levels,
decentralization dominates; when the spillovers are high, centralization is preferred.19
Second, comparison of the two centralized systems with diﬀerent taxations remains as
above. This is because the two systems’ surpluses decrease in the same rate with increasing
heterogeneity.20 Thus, centralization with non-uniform taxation dominates centralization
with uniform tax system for all κ < 1/2. When spillovers are complete, the two systems
19What happens with both critical levels of spillovers as heterogeneity increases may be analyzed by let-
ting Sd(κ,α),Sc
u(κ,α) and Sc
n(κ,α) denote surpluses under decentralization, centralization with uniform and
non-uniform taxation, respectively, when (m1,m2) = (αω,(1−α)ω), where α ∈  1/2,1  measures the degree
of heterogeneity between the regions.
The ﬁrst critical level of κ, denoted κ∗




To show that κ∗

































The expression in the latter parentheses equals zero when α = 1/2 and is positive for all α in the range
(1/2,1). Thus, the diﬀerence is positive for all α ∈ (1/2,1) and κ∗
1 < 1/2 which implies that the critical level
of spillovers increases with increasing heterogeneity.
The second critical level of κ, denoted κ∗












for all κ and α, the critical level of spillovers increases with
increasing heterogeneity for the non-uniform taxation case as well.
20See the previous footnote.
19generate the same level of surplus. This reﬂects the fact that, in the uniform taxation case,
representative in the winning coalition has incentives to provide the same level of public
goods to both regions which corresponds to the case of non-uniform taxation.
Furthermore, surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is lower than that
under centralization in the standard analysis. In the non-uniform taxation case, increasing
heterogeneity causes the potential provisions of the two representatives to vary still more.
This decreases the surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation and because the
surplus under centralized system in the traditional analysis is independent of heterogeneity,
centralization with non-uniform tax system generates lower public goods surplus.21 It follows
that political economy analysis weakens the case for centralization when the taxation is non-
uniform but not as considerably as in the case of a centralized system with uniform taxation.
5 Centralization with a Cooperative Legislature and
Two Forms of Taxation
Under the minimum winning coalition view of legislative decision-making, policy outcomes
are ex ante Pareto ineﬃcient from the viewpoint of the representatives. Therefore, legislators
may ﬁnd a way around the ineﬃciency created by majoritarian decision criteria and prefer
a less random outcome to the “feast or famine” implied by the minimum winning coalition
theory. The representatives with power may, to a given extent, allocate beneﬁts to those
outside the coalition on the understanding that non-members would behave similarly if
they were in power. However, there are many pairs of local public goods levels that are
both eﬃcient from the viewpoint of the representatives and that ex ante Pareto dominate
minimum winning coalition outcomes.
Here we will assume the case when the representatives agree to the public goods alloca-
tion that maximizes their joint surplus, i.e. their behavior can be described by the utilitarian
21Let Sc
t(κ,α) and Sc
n(κ,α) denote surpluses under centralization in the standard analysis and with non-
uniform taxation, respectively, when (m1,m2) = (αω,(1 − α)ω), where α ∈ (1/2,1) measures the degree
of heterogeneity. From the previous discussion we know that Sc







< 0 for all α ∈ (1/2,1). This implies that increasing heterogeneity decreases surplus
under centralization with non-uniform tax system which is then lower than that under a centralized system
in the traditional analysis.
20bargaining solution. This means that each representative now maximizes the same utility
function as the others. They agree to form a coalition where everybody will have a weight
in the decision making process, not just those who succeed to form a minimum winning
coalition. This norm requires representatives to take into account the costs and beneﬁts
to their colleagues and would seem to oﬀer centralization the best chance of dominating
decentralization given our welfare criterion. But to what extent will centralization dominate
decentralization will again depend on the form of taxation.
5.1 Policy Determination with Uniform Taxation
With uniform taxation and representatives of types λ1 and λ2, the policy outcome, (g1(λ1,λ2),













It is straightforward to show that public goods levels maximizing this joint surplus are
(g1(λ1,λ2),g2(λ1,λ2)) =
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It is clear that if both districts elected representatives of the median types, the legislature
would select the surplus maximizing public goods levels.
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Turning to the election stage, we again assume that the pair of representatives will be of the
majority preferred types that is deﬁned in the by now familiar way. The main additional
complication created by a cooperative legislature lies in ﬁnding the majority preferred types.
This is because the public good level for each region depends on the type of legislator in
both districts and, thereby, generates incentives for citizens in each district to delegate policy
making strategically to a representative with diﬀerent tastes than their own. This intention
arises because sincere voting becomes suboptimal now.
To begin with, note that a pair of representative types (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred if
and only if in each district i the median type prefers λ∗
i to any other type λ ∈  0,λ , given
21the other district’s type λ∗
−i.22 Thus, (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if it is a Nash
equilibrium of the two player game in which each player has strategy set  0,λ  and player
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In this game, the district i median citizen tries to manipulate λi so that he obtains something
close to his preferred policy outcome anticipating the election outcomes in the other region
and the subsequent working of the legislature.23 He only has one degree of freedom, λi, but
two objectives, (g1,g2). While raising λi always leads to an increase in gi, if κ > 0 it also
raises g−i.




ˆ κ3 + (1 − ˆ κ)3
ˆ κ(1 − ˆ κ)
.
When the districts are identical, ˆ κ = 1/2. In the non-identical districts case, ˆ κ < 1/2. Then:
Lemma 4. Suppose that the tax system is uniform across districts and the assumptions
of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed. Then the policy chosen under a centralized
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if κ ≥ ˆ κ.
It can be easily seen that the cooperative legislature does not select the surplus maximiz-
ing public goods levels. While a cooperative legislature deals with problems of uncertainty
and misallocation that were present in the non-cooperative legislature, a new feature emerges:
22If district i elects a citizen of a higher type, then it receives more of both public goods. Then the same
argument applies as in the footnote 17.
23To put it more rigorously, all citizens in region i now have an interest in manipulating λi to obtain
something close to their preferred policy outcome. In other words, all voters in district i have the same
interest in shifting λi according to their preferences and expectations of the election outcomes in the other
regions and subsequent working of the legislature.
22• Strategic delegation: each district’s median voter delegates policy-making to a repre-
sentative of diﬀerent type than median.
5.1.1 Comparative Statics
When the regions are identical (m1 = m2 = m), it follows from the Lemma that g1 = g2 =
2m[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]/p. Recall that with identical districts, the surplus maximizing level of
public goods is g1 = g2 = m/p. Thus, local public goods are over-provided in both regions
for all κ < 1/2. The extent of this over-provision is decreasing with increasing spillovers and
over-provision does not occur only when the spillovers are maximal (κ = 1/2). In such a
case, local public goods are provided optimally.
The incentives to strategically delegate can be seen most clearly in the case of zero
spillovers. Then, the optimal spending levels for the median voter from region 2 are (g1,g2) =
(0,2m/p). Assume for a moment that both districts elect the median type representatives.
This would lead to a policy outcome (g1,g2) = (m/p,m/p). But if the district 2 elected a
representative with a stronger taste for public spending, it would get more of its local public
good with no impact on the district 1’s public good level. Thus, each region is drawn to
elect a type 2m representative.
As spillovers increase, the optimal spending levels in the two districts for each median
voter converge. Electing a representative with a higher preference for public goods spending
increases spending in the other region as well. Thus, the districts elect representatives with
preferences closer to their median. When the spillovers are maximal, each region elects a
median type representative and local public goods are provided at the surplus maximizing
level.
With heterogeneity, an additional conﬂict over the level of public spending enters the
picture, which can be seen most clearly in the case of complete spillovers. If κ = 1/2
and each region elects a representative of the median type, the public goods levels are
g1 = g2 = (m1 + m2)/2p. This common level is too low for district 1’s median voter and
too high for region 2’s. This gives district 1’s median voter an incentive to have a higher
representative type to boost public goods spending, while region 2’s median voter desires a
representative with lower public goods preferences. They pull in opposite directions until
23one or both districts has put in their most extreme type. Our assumption that 2m1 < λ
implies that district 1 can obtain its preferred public goods level when district 2 has put in
its most extreme type. Thus, district 1’s median voter ends up getting his preferred outcome
of g1 = g2 = m1/p.
This additional conﬂict of interest creates a complex relationship between spillovers and
public goods levels. Analyzing the solutions described in the Lemma, it can be shown that
district 1’s public good level is decreasing in the level of spillovers for κ suﬃciently small
and κ > ˆ κ.24 However, it is increasing in spillovers for κ suﬃciently close to but less than ˆ κ.
This reﬂects the conﬂict over spending levels that arises as spillovers increase. To prevent
district 2 from pulling down spending in both districts, district 1’s median voter elects a
representative with a higher public goods valuation, raising district 1’s public good level.
Region 2’s public good level is decreasing in spillovers for κ < ˆ κ and increasing thereafter. It
increases for spillover levels in excess of ˆ κ, because it is now eﬀectively controlled by district
1’s median voter.
Comparing these outcomes with the surplus maximizing levels of public goods, district
1’s public good level is always too high. The level provided to region 2 is too high for small
κ and when κ is suﬃciently large. However, it is less than the surplus maximizing level for
κ suﬃciently close to ˆ κ. Note that this under-provision is in contrast to the over-provision
results for the case of identical districts.
It is clear at this point that, although the legislature follows the utilitarian bargaining
solution, the problem of strategic delegation causes that this solution may still be far from
the surplus maximizing ideal. By introducing non-uniform taxation as deﬁned above, we
will nevertheless show that this problem is signiﬁcantly suppressed.
5.2 Policy Determination with Non-uniform Taxation
If the taxation is non-uniform and the representatives are of types λ1 and λ2, the policy
outcome (g1(λ1,λ2), g2(λ1,λ2)) will again maximize the representatives’ joint surplus given
24This and the other claims concerning the public goods levels in Lemma 4 are established in T. Besley
and S. Coate’s discussion paper. In this paper we focus on the non-uniform taxation case which will be







{λi[(1 − κ)lngi + κlng−i] − p[(1 − κ)gi + κg−i]}.
It is straightforward to verify that public goods levels maximizing this joint surplus are again
(g1(λ1,λ2),g2(λ1,λ2)) =
 
λ1(1 − κ) + λ2κ
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Thus, as applicable also in the uniform taxation case, if both regions elected representatives
of the median types, the legislature would select the surplus maximizing levels of public
goods.
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As was the case in the previous section, the main complication lies in ﬁnding the majority
preferred types when sincere voting is suboptimal. This complication is again due to the
fact that public good level in each district depends on the type of legislator in both regions
and, thereby, generates incentives for citizens in each region to strategically delegate policy
making to a representative with diﬀerent public goods preferences than their own.
A pair of representative types (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if in each district
i the median type prefers λ∗
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In this game, the district i median citizen tries to manipulate λi so that he obtains
something close to his preferred policy outcome anticipating the election outcomes in the
25If district i elects a citizen of a higher type, then it receives more of both public goods. Then the same
argument applies as in the footnote 17.
25other region and the subsequent working of the legislature. While raising λi always leads to
an increase in gi, if κ > 0 it also raises g−i.
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.
When the districts are identical, ˆ κ = 1/2. In the non-identical districts case, ˆ κ < 1/2. Then
we have:
Lemma 5. Suppose that the tax system is non-uniform across districts and the assumptions
of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed. Then the policy chosen under a centralized
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if κ ≥ ˆ κ.
It is easily seen that the cooperative legislature does not always select the surplus maxi-
mizing public good levels. However, though strategic delegation occurs also when the taxation
is non-uniform, it is signiﬁcantly suppressed compared to the uniform taxation case in a way
we will now explain.
5.2.1 Comparative Statics
With identical districts (m1 = m2 = m), the Lemma implies that (g1,g2) = (m/p,m/p)
which are the surplus maximizing public goods levels. Thus, strategic delegation is completely
eliminated when the taxation is non-uniform and the districts are homogeneous. This is
because neither district is drawn to elect a representative with stronger taste for public
goods as each region knows that it will have to pay proportionally to its consumption. If it
elected a higher type representative, the resulting increase in the provision of local public
goods would be fully ﬁnanced by the given district, which is in contrast to the uniform-
taxation case where both districts participate at this increase in ﬁnancing only by a half.
26Therefore, each district elects a median type representative and the local public goods are
provided optimally, regardless of the level of spillovers.
Heterogeneity again gives rise to strategic delegation but in a lesser extent compared
to the uniform taxation case. The only situation in which strategic delegation with non-
uniform taxation is as strong as in the case of uniform taxation occurs when the spillovers
are maximal. If κ = 1/2 and each district elects a median type representative, the policy
outcome is g1 = g2 = (m1 + m2)/2p. But this level is too low for region 1’s median voter
and too high for that of region 2.26 This gives district 1’s median voter an incentive to
elect a higher type representative and region 2’s median voter an incentive to have a lower
representative type. So they pull in opposite directions until one or both districts has put
in their most extreme type. Under our assumption that 2m1 < λ, region 1 can obtain its
preferred public good levels when district 2 has put in its most extreme type.
The relationship between public goods levels and spillovers is again very complex. Dis-
trict 1’s public good level is increasing in the level of spillovers for κ < ˆ κ.27 This appears
puzzling as district 1’s median voter’s preferred public good level is actually constant in
spillovers. The result reﬂects the conﬂict over spending levels. To prevent district 2 from
pulling down spending in both regions, district 1’s median voter elects a representative with
a higher taste for public spending, raising region 1’s public good level. Furthermore, district
1’s public good level is decreasing for κ suﬃciently close to 1/2. However, it can increase or
decrease for κ suﬃciently close to but higher than ˆ κ. District 2’s public good level is decreas-
ing in the level of spillovers for κ < ˆ κ and increasing thereafter. It increases for spillovers in
excess of ˆ κ because it is now eﬀectively controlled by region 1’s median voter.
Two comparisons require analysis here. Firstly, comparing these policy outcomes with
the surplus maximizing levels, district 1’s public good level is too high for all levels of
spillovers except when κ = 0. In this case, region 1’s public good is provided at the surplus
maximizing level. The level provided to district 2 is too low for all κ < ˆ κ and for κ higher than
but suﬃciently close to ˆ κ. The only exception here is again when κ = 0. In this case district
26The optimal spending levels for the district 1’s median voter are g1 = g2 = m1/p whereas for the region
2’s median voter are g1 = g2 = m2/p.
27This and the other claims concerning the public goods levels from Lemma 5 are established in the
Appendix.
272’s public good level is the surplus maximizing one. Moreover, district 2’s public good level is
too high for κ suﬃciently close to 1/2. Secondly, comparing public goods levels in the two tax
systems, each district’s public good is provided at higher level when the taxation is uniform
than under the non-uniform tax system, except when spillovers are maximal. In such a case,
both systems generate the same public goods levels. Thus, non-uniform taxation suppresses,
though not completely eliminates, the incentives to delegate policy-making strategically to
representatives with higher preferences for public spending.
5.3 Centralization vs. Decentralization
5.3.1 Homogeneous districts
We already know that decentralization produces the surplus maximizing public goods levels
only in the case of zero spillovers. Public goods levels under centralization with uniform taxa-
tion are surplus maximizing only when spillovers are complete and the districts are identical.
It follows that, in the case of identical regions, decentralization dominates when spillovers are
small and centralization is preferred when spillovers are large. Surplus under centralization
with uniform taxation increases with increasing κ and a critical value of spillovers exists
above which centralization is welfare superior.
When the districts are identical, centralization with non-uniform taxation produces the
surplus maximizing public goods levels for all spillover levels. This surplus is higher than
that under decentralization for all κ except when the spillovers are absent. In such a case,
both systems generate the surplus maximizing public goods levels. The next proposition
and Figure 4 summarize these results.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed,
the legislature is cooperative, and the districts are identical. Then
(i) If the taxation is uniform, there is a critical value of κ, strictly greater than 0 but less
than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus if and only
if κ exceeds this critical level.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform across districts and spillovers are present (κ > 0), a
centralized system produces a higher level of surplus than does decentralization. Absent
28spillovers (κ = 0), the two systems generate the same level of surplus.
(iii) Surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is higher than that under centra-
lization with uniform taxation except when the spillovers are maximal (κ = 1/2). In















Figure 4: Aggregate public goods surpluses under decentralization (Sd), centralization with
uniform (Sc
u) and non-uniform (Sc
n) taxation in the case of identical districts.
There are two important ﬁndings which require analysis. First, when the taxation is
uniform, decentralization dominates when spillovers are low and centralization is preferred
when spillovers are high, whereas a critical level of spillovers exists and is in the range
(0,1/2). This is in line with the results obtained in the preceding sections when the legislature
was based on minimum-winning coalition. Second, this does not hold, however, when the
taxation under centralization is non-uniform. Such a system produces surplus maximizing
public goods levels regardless of the level of spillovers and dominates decentralization for all
κ > 0. Thus, non-uniform taxation is a signiﬁcant tool for eliminating strategic delegation
in the case of identical regions.
5.3.2 Heterogeneous districts
When the districts are heterogeneous, decentralization continues to dominate centralization
with uniform taxation when spillovers are small and centralization is preferred when spillovers
are large.
29The case of centralization with non-uniform taxation is a bit more complicated when
it comes to heterogeneous districts. Centralization still dominates decentralization when
spillovers are large, but it dominates decentralization even when spillovers are small. Fur-
thermore, it may be that centralization with non-uniform taxation produces a higher public
goods surplus than does decentralization for all κ > 0. However, there is no general pre-
sumption that this is always so. Decentralization may dominate centralization when κ is
suﬃciently close to ˆ κ. These ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition and Fig-
ure 5.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are satisﬁed,
the legislature is cooperative, and the districts are non-identical. Then
(i) If the taxation is uniform, a decentralized system produces a higher level of surplus
when spillovers are suﬃciently small, while a centralized system produces a higher level
of surplus when spillovers are suﬃciently large.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform, a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus
than does decentralization when spillovers are suﬃciently large and when spillovers are
suﬃciently small but positive. Absent spillovers, the two systems generate the same
public goods surplus.
(iii) Surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is higher than that under centra-
lization with uniform tax system except when the spillovers are maximal (κ = 1/2). In
this case, both systems produce the same public goods surplus.
Three important lessons can be drawn from these statements. To begin with, the basic
conclusions of part (i) of the Proposition 3 generalize to the case of a cooperative legisla-
ture. When the centralized system is ﬁnanced by uniform taxation, decentralization domi-
nates centralization for low spillover levels, while centralization dominates for high levels of
spillovers. The only diﬀerence here is that we cannot show that there exists a critical level
of spillovers. This reﬂects the fact that there is no general presumption that the relative
performance of centralization is always increasing in spillovers. Surplus under centralization
is decreasing in κ for κ suﬃciently close to but lower than ˆ κ.





























Figure 5: Aggregate public goods surpluses under decentralization (Sd), centralization with
uniform (Sc
u) and non-uniform (Sc
n) taxation in the case of non-identical districts.
Secondly, the just mentioned conclusions do not carry over to centralization with non-
uniform tax system. Under this taxation, the centralized system produces higher surplus
than does decentralization even for low levels of spillovers. This is due to the nature of
a non-uniform tax system which means that the ﬁnancing of public goods is not shared
any more but is proportionally distributed between regions. However, we cannot show that
centralization always dominates decentralization for all spillover levels. This reﬂects the fact
that when the districts are suﬃciently heterogenous, decentralized system produces higher
surplus for κ suﬃciently close to ˆ κ which is demonstrated in Figure 5a. On the other hand,
when the regions do not diﬀer very much in their public goods preferences, centralization with
non-uniform taxation dominates decentralization for all κ > 0 (Figure 5b). Thus, although
strategic delegation does arise under this system as well, it does so in a much lesser extent
compared to the uniform taxation case. However, the policy outcomes produced under this
system can still be improved in the direction towards the surplus maximizing ideal.
Finally, comparing the two tax systems, we must again conclude that centralization
with non-uniform taxation dominates centralization with uniform tax system for all κ <
1/2. When the spillovers are maximal, the two systems produce the same public goods
surplus. This is in line with the results obtained for centralization based on minimum winning
coalition. We have thus generalized the conclusion that non-uniform tax system produces
strictly better policy outcomes than does uniform taxation. In the case of cooperative
31legislature, centralization based on this taxation may even dominate decentralization for all
κ > 0 which is a stunning result.
6 Conclusion
This paper has taken a fresh look at the relative merits of centralized and decentralized
provision of local public goods. To allow for non-uniform public goods and district-speciﬁc
taxes means to enhance performance of centralization relative to the case in which taxation
is uniform across regions. Eliminating the feature of shared costs has a very positive eﬀect
on the performance of a centralized system in all of the studied cases. Speciﬁcally, cen-
tralized system with non-uniform taxation appears to dominate centralization with uniform
tax system for all levels of spillovers except when the spillovers are maximal. This result
holds regardless of heterogeneity in tastes and the basis on which the legislative behavior
functions.
When decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives, non-uniform
tax system suppresses or completely eliminates the drawbacks created by a centralized system
with uniform ﬁnancing. If decisions on local public goods are made by a minimum winning
coalition of representatives, non-uniform taxation signiﬁcantly reduces (when the regions are
non-identical) or completely eliminates (in the case of identical districts) the misallocation
problem. Nevertheless, the uncertainty remains due to the unknown identity of the coalition
in either case. If decisions are made on a more cooperative basis, then the strategic delegation
is signiﬁcantly suppressed (when the districts are non-identical) or completely eliminated (in
the case of identical regions).
Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that the aggregate public goods surplus under de-
centralization is
S
d(κ) = [m1(1 − κ) + m2κ]ln
m1(1 − κ)
p
+ [m2(1 − κ) + m1κ]ln
m2(1 − κ)
p
− m1(1 − κ) − m2(1 − κ),
32while surplus under centralization in the traditional analysis is
S
c
t(κ) = [m1 + m2]ln
m1 + m2
2p
− m1 − m2.
For part (i) (using a convention m1 = m2 = m), we establish three claims from which the
proof will clearly follow.
Claim 1. Sc
t(0) = Sd(0) and Sc
t(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
Both statements are easily proven by inserting all the necessary variables into the functions
of surpluses.
Claim 2. Surplus under centralization is independent of κ.
This claim is clearly true.
Claim 3. Surplus under decentralization is decreasing in κ.







Analogically, we prove part (ii) by proving three following claims.
Claim 1. Sc
t(0) < Sd(0) and Sc
t(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
Let (m1,m2) be given and suppose that m1 > m2. We can ﬁnd ω > 0 and α ∈  1/2,1  so
that (m1,m2) = (αω,(1 − α)ω). For the ﬁrst inequality, this implies that
S
c






d(0,α) = αω ln
αω
p








t(0,α) = αω ln
αω
p
+ (1 − α)ω ln
(1 − α)ω
p




= αω lnαω + ω ln(1 − α)ω − αω ln(1 − α)ω − ω lnω + ω ln2




+ ω ln(1 − α) + ω ln2.







> 0, for all α ∈ (1/2,1 .
33Thus, the diﬀerence is increasing in α and since Sd(0,1/2) = Sc
t(0,1/2), the inequality holds
for all α in the relevant range.
For the latter inequality, surplus under centralization is independent of heterogeneity
and therefore Sc
t(0,α) = Sc






























































































Thus, this diﬀerence is non-decreasing in α. So if Sc
t(1/2,1/2) > Sd(1/2,1/2), then the
inequality holds for all α in the relevant range. But α = 1/2 corresponds to the identical
districts case and we already know that surplus under centralization is higher than under
decentralization then.
Claim 2. Surplus under centralization is independent of κ.
This claim is clearly true.




(κ) = (m2 − m1)ln
m1
m2




Proof of Proposition 2. Aggregate public goods surplus under decentralization is as in
the traditional analysis, while, in the case of identical districts (m1 = m2 = m), surplus
under centralization


















We will prove the proposition via four following claims.
Claim 1. Sc










R, which implies the former
statement.










Rearranging the inequality, we come to the following one: ln4 > 1, which is clearly true.
Claim 2. Sc








> 0, for all κ ∈ (0,1/2).
Claim 3. Sc
n(κ) = Sc
t(κ) for all κ ∈  0,1/2 .




This claim is clear as well.
It is straightforward to show that Claims 1 and 2 prove part (i). Due to the fact proved
in Claim 3, part (ii) can be proven similarly as has been performed in Proposition 1. Finally,
Claims 2, 3 and 4 imply part (iii) of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. When the districts are non-identical (m1 > m2), surplus under
centralization



























− m1 − m2;














− m1 − m2.
Again, we prove the proposition by establishing 7 claims from which the proof of the Propo-
sition 3 will follow.
35Claim1. Sc
u(0) < Sd(0) and Sc
u(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
Sc
u(κ) tends to negative inﬁnity as κ approaches zero from the right and Sd(0) is a real
number, which implies the former statement. Rearranging the latter one, we again come to
the inequality ln4 > 1, which clearly holds.
Claim 2. Sc
u(κ) is increasing in κ.




(κ) = (m1 + m2)
1 − 2κ
2κ(1 − κ)




We ﬁrst prove that Sc
u(1/2) < Sc












− m1 − m2 < (m1 + m2)ln
m1 + m2
2p
− m1 − m2









2 + 2m1m2 + m2
2
0 < (m1 − m2)
2.
The last inequality holds due to the fact that m1  = m2 and since all the operations were
equivalent, the inequality Sc
u(1/2) < Sc
t(1/2) is proven. Since Claim 2 proves that Sc
u(κ) is
increasing in κ and Sc
t(κ) is constant in κ, it follows that Sc
u(κ) < Sc
t(κ) for all κ ∈  0,1/2 .
Claim 4. Sc
n(0) < Sd(0) and Sc
n(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
For the former inequality, we may write Sc
n(0) = ξ(1/2) and Sd(0) = ξ(0), where
ξ(φ) = [(1 − φ)m1 + φm2]ln
m1
p
+ [(1 − φ)m2 + φm1]ln
m2
p
− m1 − m2.
Observe that
ξ




m2       
>0
.
Since the function ξ(φ) is decreasing for all φ ∈  0,1/2 , it holds that
S
c
n(0) = ξ(1/2) < ξ(0) = S
d(0).
36For the latter statement, we may write Sc













− φ(m1 + m2).
Diﬀerentiating, we obtain
ξ







Since the function ξ(φ) is increasing for all φ ∈  1/2,1 , it follows that
S
c
n(1/2) = ξ(1) > ξ(1/2) = S
d(1/2).
Claim 5. Sc
n(κ) is independent of κ.




This inequality follows from concavity of function ln( ) :
S
c






















n(κ) for all κ < 1/2 and Sc
u(1/2) = Sc
n(1/2).
The equality clearly holds. The facts that Sc
u( ) is increasing in κ and Sc
n( ) is constant in κ
imply the inequality for all κ < 1/2.
For part (i) of the Proposition, the ﬁrst two Claims imply the existence of a critical
value of κ, strictly greater than 0 but less than 1/2, such that a centralized system with
uniform taxation produces a higher level of surplus than does decentralization if and only if
κ exceeds this critical level. The fact that surplus under decentralization is the same as in
the standard analysis combined with Claim 3 imply that the critical level of κ is higher for
centralization with uniform taxation than that implied by the traditional analysis.
As for the part (ii), Claims 4 and 5 imply the existence of a critical value of κ, strictly
greater than 0 but less than 1/2, such that a centralized system with non-uniform taxation
produces a higher level of surplus than does decentralization if and only if κ exceeds this
critical level. Claim 6 and the fact that surplus under decentralization is the same as in
the traditional analysis imply that the critical level of spillovers is higher in the centralized
system with non-uniform taxation than under centralization in the standard analysis. Claim
7 further implies that the critical level of κ under a centralized system with non-uniform
taxation is lower than that under centralization with uniform taxation.
37Finally, part (iii) follows from Claims 3, 6 and 7.
Proof of Lemma 4. Due to close similarity between the proof of this Lemma and Lemma 5
and the fact that in this paper we focus more on non-uniform tax system, we refer to Besley
and Coate (2003) for a thorough proof of this Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5. As mentioned in the text, (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is majority preferred if and only
if (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the two player game in which each player has strategy
set  0,λ  and player i ∈ {1,2} has payoﬀ function Ui(λ1,λ2). We prove the Lemma by
calculating the set of equilibria of this game and computing the associated policy outcomes.
Note ﬁrst that each player’s payoﬀ function is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
strictly concave function of his strategy and each player’s strategy set is compact and convex.
Thus, the set of equilibria is non-empty. Moreover, ∂2U1/∂λ1∂λ2 < 0 and ∂2U2/∂λ2∂λ1 < 0,
implying that types are strategic substitutes.
For i = 1,2, let ri :  0,λ  →  0,λ  denote the region i median voter’s reaction function.
By deﬁnition, for all λ2 ∈  0,λ ,
r1(λ2) = arg max{U1(r1,λ2) : r1 ∈  0,λ },
and for all λ1 ∈  0,λ ,
r2(λ1) = arg max{U2(λ1,r2) : r2 ∈  0,λ }.
Then, (λ∗
1,λ∗





Some general features of the reaction functions follow from the properties of the payoﬀ
functions. The fact that each player’s payoﬀ is a strictly concave and diﬀerentiable function
of his strategy implies (i) that r1(λ2) = 0 if ∂U1(0,λ2)/∂λ1 < 0; (ii) that r1(λ2) = λ if
∂U1(λ,λ2)/∂λ1 > 0; and (iii) that otherwise r1(λ2) is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order
condition ∂U1(r1(λ2),λ2)/∂λ1 = 0. In addition, the fact that types are strategic substitutes
implies that r1(λ2) is non-increasing. Analogical remarks apply to the district 2 median
voter’s reaction function.
It remains therefore to determine the details of each player’s reaction function. Let
λ2(λ1) denote the level of λ2(λ1) beyond which district 1’s median voter (district 2’s median










λ1(1 − κ) + λ2κ
+
κ2
λ2(1 − κ) + λ1κ
 








λ2(1 − κ) + λ1κ
+
κ2
λ1(1 − κ) + λ2κ
 





(1 − κ)3 + κ3






(1 − κ)3 + κ3




(1 − κ)3 + κ3
κ(1 − κ)(1 − 2κ + 2κ2)
is decreasing in κ, takes on the value 2 when κ = 1/2





2 ) denote the highest type representative region 1’s (region 2’s) median
voter would want. These levels are implicitly deﬁned by the equalities
∂U1(λ
×
















1 − 2κ + 2κ2.
Note that 1/(1 − 2κ + 2κ2) is increasing in κ, takes on the value 1 when κ = 0 and value
2 when κ = 1/2. This implies that λ
×
1 ≤ 2m1 and λ
×
2 ≤ 2m2. By assumption, 2mi < λ, so
that the upper bound constraint on type choice is not binding here.
39We may conclude from the above that for all λ2 ∈  0,min{λ2,λ} , r1(λ2) is implicitly




and for all λ2 ∈ (min{λ2,λ},λ ,
r1(λ2) = 0.
Further, we know that r1(0) = λ
×
1 and that r1(λ2) is downward sloping on  0,min{λ2,λ} .





and for all λ1 ∈ (min{λ1,λ},λ ,
r2(λ1) = 0.
Further, we know that r2(0) = λ
×
2 and that r2(λ1) is downward sloping on  0,min{λ1,λ} .
We can now prove the lemma. If κ < ˆ κ, it follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ κ in the text
that (κ3 + (1 − κ)3)/κ(1 − κ) > m1/m2. This in turn implies that
λ1 = m2
 
(1 − κ)3 + κ3











(1 − κ)3 + κ3
κ(1 − κ)(1 − 2κ + 2κ2)
 
> 2m2 ≥ λ
×
2 .
These inequalities imply that there exists no boundary equilibria in which λ∗
i = 0 for one or
more districts. If λ∗
2 = 0, then λ∗
1 = r1(0) = λ
×
1 , but since λ
×
1 < λ1 we know that r2(λ
×
1 ) > 0
which contradicts the fact that λ∗
2 = 0. If λ∗
1 = 0, then λ∗
2 = r2(0) = λ
×
2 , but since λ
×
2 < λ2
we know that r1(λ
×
2 ) > 0 which contradicts the fact that λ∗
1 = 0. Since maxri(λ−i) < λ, it is
apparent that there can be no boundary equilibria in which λ∗
i = λ for one or more districts.
It follows that there must exist an interior equilibrium. Any such equilibrium (λ∗
1, λ∗
2)
must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions ∂Ui(λ∗
1,λ∗
2)/∂λi = 0 for i ∈ {1,2}. Using the expres-










2(1 − κ) + λ∗
1κ
 












1(1 − κ) + λ∗
2κ
 
= (1 − 2κ + 2κ
2).
Combining the two ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain
λ∗
1(1 − κ) + λ∗
2κ
λ∗
2(1 − κ) + λ∗
1κ
=
m1(1 − κ)2 − m2κ2
m2(1 − κ)2 − m1κ2.





1(1 − κ) + λ
∗
2κ =
m1m2[(1 − κ)4 − κ4]
[m2(1 − κ)2 − m1κ2](1 − 2κ + 2κ2)
=
m1[(1 − κ)2 − κ2][(1 − κ)2 + κ2]
 






[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]
=
m1[(1 − κ)2 − k2]
 








2(1 − κ) + λ
∗
1κ =
m1m2[(1 − κ)4 − κ4]
[m1(1 − κ)2 − m2κ2](1 − 2κ + 2κ2)
=








[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]
=




(1 − κ)2 − κ2
 .





m1[(1 − κ)2 − k2]
 

















If κ ≥ ˆ κ, it follows that (κ3 + (1 − κ)3)/κ(1 − κ) ≤ m1/m2, which in turn implies that
λ1 = m2
 
(1 − κ)3 + κ3













This is because r2(λ
×
1 ) = 0 and r1(0) = λ
×
1 . The same arguments from above imply that
there exist no other boundary equilibria. We also claim that there are no interior equilibria.
Any such equilibrium (λ∗
1,λ∗
2) must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions ∂Ui(λ∗
1,λ∗
2)/∂λi = 0 for































[m2((1 − κ)3 + κ3) − m1κ(1 − κ)]




But the assumption that κ ≥ ˆ κ implies that λ∗
2 ≤ 0 if λ∗
1 > 0, which, in turn, is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that (λ∗
1,λ∗













(1 − κ)2 + κ2,0
 





[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]p
,
m1κ











2 (κ)) denote public goods levels described in
Lemma 5 and 4, respectively, i.e. local public goods levels in district 1 and 2 under centra-
lization with non-uniform and uniform taxation. Assume that m1 > m2. Then
(i) g
c−n
1 (κ) is increasing for κ < ˆ κ and decreasing for κ suﬃciently close to 1/2, but can
be increasing or decreasing for κ suﬃciently close to but higher than ˆ κ.
(ii) g
c−n
2 (κ) is decreasing for κ < ˆ κ and increasing thereafter.
(iii) g
c−n
1 (κ) is higher than the surplus maximizing level for κ > 0 and equals the surplus
maximizing level only when κ = 0.
(iv) g
c−n
2 (κ) is lower than the surplus maximizing level for κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ  and κ suﬃciently
close to but higher than ˆ κ, but it exceeds the surplus maximizing level for κ suﬃciently























m1[(1 − κ)2 − k2]
 


























42we will show that θ










1 − κ + κ
m1
m2









and we need to show that for all κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ)
1 − κ + κ
m1
m2








Observe that the expression on the left hand side is increasing in
m1
m2
∈ (1,+∞) for all
κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ), and that
1 − κ + κ




which clearly holds. Thus, the desired inequality holds for all
m1
m2
∈ (1,+∞) and κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ).





[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]p
.
Letting







we will show that θ(κ) is increasing for small κ and decreasing for κ close to 1/2. The




2κ2 − 4κ + 1
(1 − 2κ + 2κ2)(1 − κ)
.
Calculating its value in 0 and 1/2, we come to θ
′(0) = 1 and θ
′(1/2) = −2. Putting the
derivative equal to 0, we ﬁnd out that θ(κ) is increasing for all κ < 1−
√
2/2 and decreasing
thereafter. Thus, it depends on the value of ˆ κ whether g
c−n
1 (κ) is decreasing for all κ ≥ ˆ κ




1 (κ) is decreasing for all κ ≥ ˆ κ. If,




1 (κ) is increasing for κ suﬃciently close to but higher
than ˆ κ, and decreasing thereafter.



















































and we will show that for all κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ)
m1
m2









Observe that the expression on the left hand side is decreasing in
m1
m2
for all κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ), and
that
1 − κ + κ




Thus, the inequality holds for all
m1
m2
∈ (1,+∞) and κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ).





[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]p
.
Letting
θ(κ) = ln{m1κ} − ln{[(1 − κ)
2 + κ
2]p},








1 − 2κ + 2κ2 =
1 − 3κ + 2κ2
κ(1 − 2κ + 2κ2)
.
Numerator of the last expression is positive for all κ ∈  0,1/2) and denominator is positive
for all κ ∈ (0,1/2 . Thus, g
c−n
2 (κ) is increasing for all κ ∈ (ˆ κ,1/2).
(iii) Suppose ﬁrst that κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ). Then, since the surplus maximizing public good level




m1[(1 − κ)2 − k2]
 












44We have already proven in Fact (i) that g
c−n
1 (κ) is increasing in κ < ˆ κ. Next observe that
the surplus maximizing public good level for region 1 is decreasing in κ. Diﬀerentiating
the expression we obtain m2 − m1 < 0, which clearly holds. Since g
c−n
1 (0) = g∗
1(0),28 the
inequality is proven for all κ in the desired range.





[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]p
>





First notice that g
c−n
1 (0) = g∗
1(0) and g
c−n
1 (1/2) > g∗
1(1/2). Secondly, we have shown in
Fact (i) that g
c−n
1 (κ) is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing and that g∗
1(κ) is decreasing in
spillovers. Thus, the inequality is proven for all κ in the relevant range  ˆ κ,1/2 .
(iv) The surplus maximizing public good level for district 2 is g∗
1(κ) = [m2(1−κ)+m1κ]/p.
Suppose that κ ≤ ˆ κ. First observe that g
c−n
2 (0) = g∗
2(0).29 Furthermore, it has already
been shown that g
c−n
2 (κ) is decreasing for all κ < ˆ κ and it is clear that g∗
2(κ) is increasing
for all κ. If follows that g
c−n
2 (κ) < g∗
2(κ) for all κ ∈ (0, ˆ κ .





[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]p
.
It is obvious that g
c−n
2 (1/2) exceeds the surplus maximizing level for κ suﬃciently close to
1/2. Since g
c−n
2 (κ) is lower than the surplus maximizing level for all κ ≤ ˆ κ, it must still be
lower for κ suﬃciently close to but higher than ˆ κ.
(v) If κ < ˆ κ, we must show that
2m1[(1 − κ)4 − k4]
 







m1[(1 − κ)2 − k2]
 


























To cancel out the denominators in the ﬁrst inequality, we need to know whether they are
positive of negative. Since the denominators are decreasing in
m1
m2
, it is suﬃcient to prove
28We obtain this result by simply calculating both public good levels in the point κ = 0.
29This can be again easily obtained by calculating the public good levels in κ = 0.
45that they are positive in ˆ κ :
(1 − ˆ κ)
2 −
(1 − ˆ κ)3 + ˆ κ3
ˆ κ(1 − ˆ κ)
ˆ κ
2 =
(1 − ˆ κ)4 − ˆ κ4
1 − ˆ κ
> 0,




which is true for all κ in the relevant range. The second inequality is equivalent to (1−κ)2+
κ2 > 1/2 for all κ, which holds.











[(1 − κ)2 + κ2]p
.




which is true for all κ in the relevant range. If κ = 1/2, it is evident that the inequalities
become equalities.
Proof of Proposition 4. When the regions are identical (m1 = m2 = m), surplus under
centralization with cooperative legislature and
1. uniform taxation is: S
c
u(κ) = 2mln
2m(1 − 2κ + 2κ2)
p
− 4m(1 − 2κ + 2κ
2);






We establish 6 claims from which the proposition will follow.
Claim 1. Sc
u(0) < Sd(0) and Sc
u(1/2) > Sd(1/2).






− 4m < 2mln
m
p




















(κ) = 4m(1 − 2κ)
 
(1 − 2κ)2
(1 − κ)2 + κ2
 
> 0 for all κ ∈ (0,1/2).
Claim 3. Sd(κ) is decreasing in κ.
This claim has already been proven in the Proof of Proposition 1.
Claim 4. Sc
n(0) = Sd(0).
This statement clearly holds.
Claim 5. Sc
n(κ) is constant in spillovers.




This can be easily proven by inserting 1/2 into the functions of surpluses.
Part (i) of the proposition follows from Claims 1, 2 and 3. Claims 3, 4 and 5 imply part
(ii) of the proposition. Finally, Claim 6, combined with Claims 2 and 5, imply part (iii) of
the proposition.









2 (κ)) be the policy outcomes under centralization with a cooperative legis-
lature and a uniform and non-uniform tax system, respectively. Then the surplus
1. with uniform taxation is:
S
c
u(κ) =[m1(1 − κ) + m2κ]lng
c−u





1 (κ) + g
c−u
2 (κ));
2. with non-uniform taxation is:
S
c
n(κ) =[m1(1 − κ) + m2κ]lng
c−n





1 (κ) + g
c−n
2 (κ)).
47We prove the proposition via 5 claims.
Claim 1. Sc
u(0) < Sd(0).
Computing this inequality we come to the following one: ln2 < 1, which clearly holds.
Claim 2. Sc
u(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
Let (m1,m2) be given. We can ﬁnd ω > 0 and α ∈ (1/2,1) such that (m1,m2) = (αω,(1 −

























































































































Thus, this diﬀerence is non-decreasing in α. So if Sc
u(1/2,1/2) > Sd(1/2,1/2), then the
inequality holds for all α in the relevant range. But α = 1/2 corresponds to the identical









n (0) − Sd (0)
 
∂κ
> 0 for all κ ∈ (0,ε), where ε > 0.


















This statement is easily checked. We leave this to the reader.
For the ﬁrst half of part (i) of the Proposition 5, we employ Claim 1 and the fact that
both surplus functions are continuous functions of κ. Then for each (m1,m2) there exists
δ > 0 such that Sc
u(κ) < Sd(κ) for all κ < δ. Similar logic with Claim 2 establish the second
half of (i).
For part (ii), by utilizing Claims 5 and 2 we can prove that Sc
n(1/2) > Sd(1/2). Since
the surplus function for the non-uniform taxation case is a continuous function of κ, for each
(m1,m2) we can ﬁnd δ > 0 such that Sc
n(1/2−κ) > Sd(1/2−κ) for all κ < δ. The latter half
of (ii) is proven by employing Claims 3 and 4 and using the fact that both surplus functions
are continuous functions of κ.
Part (iii) is algebraically very diﬃcult to prove. We, therefore, leave this to the interested
reader.
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